Salary Differences on the Board: Does Compensation Correlate with Stock Price Development?
Die Veröffentlichung beleuchtet die Diskrepanz zwischen den Gehaltserhöhungen von Vorstandsmitgliedern und der tatsächlichen Aktienkursperformance. Kritisiert wird insbesondere das Verhältnis von hohen Fixgehältern zu Boni, während die Berechnungsmethoden ebenfalls als variabel hervorgehoben werden.
In the German economy, the question is increasingly being raised as to whether rising salaries for board members always correlate with a positive development of the respective stock prices. Clear discrepancies can be observed between the jumps in board salaries and the actual performance of the stock prices. The cases of Deutsche Telekom and Scout 24 are particularly striking: Both companies recorded high salary increases, while the associated gains in stock prices were rather small or even negative. These ratios lead to criticism from observers. A central point of criticism concerns the structure of the compensation itself, as critics complain about the high fixed base salary in relation to the variable bonuses. Added to this is the lack of transparency, as the calculation methods for board compensation can vary significantly. In contrast, there are also examples where the incentive structure works: For instance, the CEO of Commerzbank benefited from a strong increase in the stock price, which paints a different picture. These comparisons shed light on the complexity and the public debate surrounding the remuneration of top managers in publicly listed companies.